Introduction
The world is currently experiencing a level 6 pandemic of infl uenza [1] . Within the fi rst six months of the outbreak, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 340,000 laboratory-confi rmed cases and 4100 deaths in 191 countries around the globe, due to a novel strain of infl uenza virus that emerged in Mexico in March 2009 [2] . These fi gures are gross underestimates of the number of actual cases, considered by epidemiologists to be many millions. Even in the cases of deaths, there is still underreporting, though to a lesser degree. We are just entering the fi rst major infl uenza season in the winter months in the Northern Hemisphere since the virus emerged. A major increase in infl uenza activity is expected that will dwarf what has occurred thus far. We are in the midst of a pandemic of acute respiratory disease unlike anything seen in decades.
The etiologic agent is a new strain of infl uenza type A virus, A/H1N1 2009. As we previously described in early May [3] , this virus is about 6% different from any known infl uenza virus in nature, and 27.2% different from its predecessor, the 2008 "seasonal fl u" strain of H1N1. The latter difference, which has been termed a "pseudo-shift" in viral protein sequence [4] , gives this infl uenza strain great potential for widespread human infection.
Nevertheless, by the truly gargantuan standards of past infl uenza pandemics, this outbreak is still relatively mild. The severity of illness, measured as morbidity and mortality, is less than in past pandemics, as is the "attack rate", the percentage of the population affected. However, the virus has the potential to better adapt to replication in humans, and to mutate over time into a more severe pathogen.
The roots of this pandemic lie in the molecular characteristics of the genome and proteins of this novel strain of infl uenza, and the purpose of this article is to delineate those as they affect the prospects for continuance of the pandemic, as well as for its control.
Defi ning infl uenza, the virus
Infl uenza virus is an enveloped virus with an RNA genome, belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae [5] . The RNA genome is segmented into 8 different RNA molecules, each with a nucleocapsid protein (NP) coat. Most segments code for only one protein of the virus, including all of those that code for the three principal structural proteins, the NP and the two surface glycoproteins. Infl uenza viruses are fi rst classifi ed into broad types by the antigenic properties of NP, into infl uenza A, B and C. The fi rst of the glycoproteins, called the hemagglutinin (HA), is responsible for attachment and entry into susceptible cells, is the principal protective antigen of the virus, and, as such, is the principal target of infl uenza vaccines. The second glycoprotein, the neuraminidase (NA), is a mucus-digesting enzyme that releases nascent virus from the cellular surface and debris, facilitating spread of the virus through the respiratory tract. Antibody to NA also reduces the severity of infl uenza, and the importance of this enzyme to the virus is underscored by the fact that neuraminidase is the target of the two drugs currently licensed against infl uenza, Tamifl u (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir). Infl uenza viruses of type A are subtyped by the antigenic characteristics of the HA and NA glycoproteins. Widespread human infection has for over a century been limited to viruses with HA subtypes H1, H1 and H3, and with NA subtypes of N1 and N2 [6, 7] . Additional criteria used to identify an infl uenza virus include the source location, an identifying number, and the year of isolation. Thus, a compound designation is used for each isolate. For the current outbreak, the prototype isolate on 9 April 2009 is designated A/California/7/2009 (H1N1).
Three other RNA segments code for the three subunits of the infl uenza replicase, responsible for both replication of the genome and expression of viral messenger RNA. One of these, PB1, also codes for a second non-structural protein in reading frame 2. This protein, called PB1-F2, contains a pro-apoptotic peptide region [8] [9] [10] . Both of the two remaining genome fragments produce two proteins each, through alternate splicing. The segment 7 produces the matrix (M1) protein associated with the viral envelope. M1 and M2, present only in infl uenza A, a viroporin facilitating permeability of infected cells. Segment 8 produces protein NS1 that counters human interferon [11] , and a nuclear export protein (NEP) that facilitates movement of infl uenza genomes across the nuclear membrane early in infl uenza replication [12] . All of the 11 viral proteins are essential in infection even in cell culture, except PB1-F2, M2 and NS1.
The impact of infl uenza as an infectious disease is due entirely to two major and unique molecular features of the virus. The segmented genome allows for independent reassortment of viral genes. Positive mutations in one gene are genetically segregated from deleterious mutations in another. Also, the HA and NA proteins are capable of an enormous degree of variability, up to 50%, of their protein sequence while still remaining functional [13] . This molecular plasticity, coupled with the capability for frequent genetic reassortment, can generate an enormous level of virus variation in response to its host environment, most especially the antiviral antibodies raised in humans against it.
The natural host of infl uenza viruses is migratory waterfowl, and avian infl uenza spreads separately through each of the Western and Eastern Hemispheres through natural bird migrations [5, 14] . From this avian source, pigs become infected, and this serves as an intermediate host adapting the virus to mammalian host cells, from which most human infl uenza arises. Swine infl uenza is endemic except in commercial production operations where vaccine is routinely used. The virus evolves more slowly in swine than in humans at its antigenic epitopes. Swine live a maximum of 5 years as breeding sows, and only a few months when produced for human consumption, so they have little ongoing immunologic memory. Humans, on the other hand, present a highly selective immune environment for a lifetime exceeding 70 years. Crossover of swine infl uenza into humans is quite rare, and almost never leads to serial infection in humans. Before 2009, the biggest exceptions to this rule were the 1918 pandemic infl uenza virus (which may also have had a direct avian source), and 230 cases of the 1976 swine infl uenza outbreak in New Jersey in the United States [15, 16] . The H1N1 2009 virus thus represents a very rare event, the crossover of swine infl uenza into a human with secondary spread in the worldwide population. Once this event occurred, however it occurred, swine do not contribute to the further spread of the virus in humans at all.
Defi ning infl uenza, the illness
The actual term used to describe the disease is "infl uenzalike illness" (ILI), that is, as it directly implies, a rather uncertain diagnosis. Both the WHO and its US counterpart, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have launched websites to monitor the pandemic and guide public policy [see http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1fl u/]. Clinical infl uenza varies greatly and overlies in symptoms a broad spectrum of acute viral respiratory infections. Classical infl uenza occurs during the winter months, November through March in the Northern Hemisphere, and May through September in the Southern Hemisphere, usually with a hiatus in infl uenza activity the other months of the year. This sharp seasonal appearance is ensconced in its name beginning in the 18th century, originally "infl uenza di freddo" in Italian, i.e. "infl uence of cold", and is related to aerosol dynamics and low humidity in colder weather [17] . ILI refers to any febrile, prostrating respiratory disease of probable viral origin. Even during this pandemic, most cases of ILI will be identifi ed on clinical grounds alone, without viral isolation or amplifi cation of the viral genome, or even a specifi c antigen detection or serological diagnosis, and will thus not be defi nitively identifi ed as a "laboratory confi rmed" case of infl uenza.
The classic presentation of true infl uenza is an acute, febrile, respiratory disease of sudden onset, involving the throat and trachea. The onset of acute disease can be so sudden that the patient remembers the hour they fell ill. The virus is most effectively spread during the prodromal and initial clinical stages of infection in the upper respiratory tract, while the disease is maximal as a tracheitis. The virus infects the ciliated epithelium of the trachea, compromising the ciliary escalator that moves respiratory mucus upward and out of the lower respiratory tract. This produces a frequent and non-productive cough that is characteristic of infl uenza. Some degree of bronchitis is common, especially in those with asthma, but pneumonia is fortunately rare. Mortality is usually low, on the order of 0.5% of confi rmed cases, and due to cardiopulmonary compromise such as asthma, heart disease, and other chronic lung disease. Secondary bacterial infection, especially with the pneumococcus, is much less a signifi cant contributor to mortality with the widespread use of antibiotics. In the present H1N1 2009 pandemic, a higher incidence of diarrhea and vomiting have been noted [18] , consistent with a younger age profi le, and a greater severity in pregnant women has been a serious concern [19] .
Abnormally severe infl uenza occurs in the case the avian infl uenza, so-called "bird fl u", of the H5 serotype, and also occurred during the catastrophic 1918 pandemic. This illness is quite different from classical infl uenza since it induces a "cytokine storm" of the acute phase non-specifi c immune response [20] . The current infl uenza in humans completely lacks the capabilities of this severe form of infl uenza, and is very unlikely to ever do so.
The WHO and CDC have issued specifi c guidelines for the detection of the novel H1N1 strain [21] . Specimens such as a nasopharyngeal swab, throat swab, tracheal aspirates are vital for a confi rmed diagnosis. It is also important to acquire the sample before the administration of any antivirals and within the fi rst four days of symptoms. If the specimen needs transportation, it should be sent at 4ºC in a viral transport medium. If the transportation is not possible for 24 h, they can be stored at -80ºC. Serological testing of paired blood samples does not assist clinical decision-making and is only of epidemiological signifi cance. The diagnostic tests include rapid tests that can be performed on spot within 10-15 min, with a low sensitivity but a specifi city of >90%. The standard tests such as viral cultures in MDCK cells or egg inoculation and immunofl uorescence antibody assay are time consuming. Real time PCR is now being widely employed for the detection of H1N1. Testing of samples with specifi c H1N1 primer probe sets should not be done if the patient does not meet the clinical and epidemiological criteria. The CDC guidelines indicate that the RT-PCR should be performed for Infl uenza A, B, H1 and H3. Unless new primer sets are available, the novel H1N1 virus would test positive for only infl uenza A given the differences in H1 from its predecessors
Impact of H1N1 2009 on India
The impact of H1N1 2009 on India obviously evolves daily as this is written. In the past, India has been a primary target of infl uenza, with great impact in its densely populated cities and river valleys especially in past pandemics [22] .
The Since entry into the Indian subcontinent is overwhelmingly by sea and air, this was a cogent strategy. Until about 1 August 2009, a high proportion of reported cases in India were interdicted imports rather than of indigenous origin. Eventually such quarantine efforts with infl uenza are doomed to fail, and since 1 August nearly all cases in India have been indigenous. However, it is important to recognize that this program was a great success, since the further back India is on the epidemic curve of H1N1 2009 infection before the availability of the H1N1 vaccine, the better off its population of 1.1 billion will be. Through 15 October, there have been 12,486 confi rmed cases of H1N1 2009 in India, with 405 deaths [http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=53224]. It is clear this is but the tip of a very large epidemiological iceberg, with most cases undetected or not counted. This is not unique to India, but a feature of virtually all countries attempting to keep up with this pandemic. In the past, prior to the recent popularity of specifi c viral testing, infl uenza activity was primarily monitored solely by reporting the number of deaths due to infl uenza/pneumonia, and this may still be the most reliable indicator. Human beings have a predilection for numerical counts and statistics because they give the illusion of certainty, but it is clear that any numbers are only useful as an index of viral activity. However, given that the number of deaths is more accurate than the number of cases, control efforts in India have been relatively successful, given its huge urban population.
A key factor in limiting the impact of H1N1 2009 on India, as elsewhere, will be public health measures, many of them common sense in nature, to slow the passage of the virus through the population [see http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1/ fl u]. Severe illness and deaths increase markedly if treatment centers become overwhelmed with cases and resources are stretched past the breaking point. Maintaining an ability to care for the sick reduces morbidity and especially mortality dramatically. [4, 23, 24] . Six of the 8 gene segments are from a so-called "triplereassortant" swine infl uenza virus that appeared in North America in the late 1990s and subsequently appeared in Eurasia by 2003 (see [16] for summary of swine infl uenza). The other two segments, for the NA and M genes, are derived from Eurasian swine infl uenza. The consensus is that this virus emerged from a singular point of origin, after being sequestered from human observation for more than a decade. When, where and how during this sequestration, the "triple reassortant" and Eurasian segments reassorted into an ancestor of H1N1 2009 is unknown. However, neither the whole Eurasian swine infl uenza genome, nor the other six gene segments missing from H1N1 2009, have yet been found in the Western Hemisphere. The simplest explanation is that the "triple-reassortant" and Eurasian viruses reassorted years ago to form an ancestor of H1N1 2009, and that this reassorted infl uenza then became sequestered as a unit, and suddenly appeared in Mexico years later after a long period of replication independent of other swine infl uenza viruses.
Assigning a location for this point of origin is a dubious exercise in the midst of the pandemic. In the past, "Spanish fl u" or "Russian fl u"were misnomers that did not refl ect the virus' true origin [25] . Fortunately, the scientifi c public has settled on a geographically neutral designation.
The earliest epicenter of the pandemic appears to have been in the state of Vera Cruz, Mexico [2] [26] . The precise origin of H1N1 2009 remains a mystery, so it is important that the scientifi c community maintain a completely open mind on the subject until defi nitive evidence is obtained. It must be recognized that in ascribing a "natural" origin for H1N1 2009, that "natural" is a relative term. Emergence and spread of novel infl uenza is now inextricably linked with human behavior and globalization of commerce. In some way, shape or form, the current pandemic may well have human fi ngerprints on its origin.
Interplay of hemagglutinin protein sequence with the human dimension of the pandemic
Since infl uenza was fi rst isolated in the 1930s, it has been axiomatic that the severity of a pandemic is proportional to the susceptibility of the human population, which is in turn directly related to the degree of change in the surface proteins of the virus, the H and N antigens [27] . The greater the change, the less that preexisting human antibodies to infl uenza can neutralize the virus, and the lower the "herd immunity" of the entire human population. Minor incremental changes in these antigens, denoted as "antigenic drift", lead to mild outbreaks. Major, sudden changes in these antigens, denoted as "antigenic shift", have led to the major pandemics of infl uenza in the 20th century. There has not been a major antigenic shift in human infl uenza since 1968.
The major component of infl uenza virus that determines its epidemiological dynamic is the predominant surface protein on the viral envelope, the H antigen. This protein serves as the hemagglutinin or HA1 attachment protein.
It determines whether the virus is able to bind to cells of different species by its ability to attach to carbohydrate receptors on the cells [16] . The protein loops that determine the sites of binding for antibody dominate the immune response to the virus. Thus the H antigen is the principal component of any infl uenza vaccine and the effi cacy of the vaccine or any naturally acquired immunity is measurable by determining the ability of the elicited antibodies to neutralize viral binding [23, 28, 29] . Table 1 Several points can be made from this sequence alignment, each of which is related to the origin and profi le of the current pandemic of H1N1 2009. First, the closest relative to the current human virus is found either in the United States, as A/swine/Indiana/P12439/2000 [3] , or in Eurasia, as A/swine/Hong Kong/415/2004 [23] , and both are swine viruses. However, 6.1% is a signifi cant degree of evolution in swine infl uenza, that can be seen in the many phylogenetic trees of H1N1 2009 represented as a quite long branch, indicating an extended period of unsampled ancestry [4, 23, 24] . Clearly, the origin of the virus, at least that contributed by the "triple-reassortant" segments of the virus, may be from either Eurasia or North America.
Second, as has been stated beginning in early May [3, 23, 28] , the peptide sequence of H1N1 2009 is quite different, 27.2%, from its 2008 predecessor and the prior "seasonal fl u" vaccine. As for most human infl uenza viruses, these differences are concentrated in those regions of HA1 that defi ne the antigenic epitopes of the protein. From this alone, one would predict no protective effect in humans of prior infection or immunization with the 2008 or similar H1viruses, which has since been confi rmed in serological studies [28, 29] . Similar degrees of difference are seen in human infl uenza viruses extending back into the late 1940s. Prior to 1940, as human infl uenza was closer to the 1918 infl uenza virus, a closer degree of sequence similarity may be seen. Recent fi ndings have shown that humans born prior to 1940, and especially those who experienced an infl uenza virus close in sequence to the 1918 virus, have some residual protection to H1N1 2009 [29] . This is refl ected in a lower attack rate for H1N1 2009 for those born many decades ago, relative to younger adults and children who have never experienced a similar virus.
Third, there is a high degree of similarity among H1 swine infl uenza isolates, and swine-origin infl uenza viruses such as A/New Jersey/8/1976, and the differences are more randomly distributed across the sequence of HA1 rather than being concentrated in the area of the antigenic epitopes as in human pandemic strains. Even though A/New Jersey/8/1976 is 11% different in sequence from H1N1 2009, proportionally many fewer of these differences are in antigenic regions than the 27.2% between the 2008 and 2009 viruses. Thus, it has been noted that those who received the 1977-78 "swine fl u" vaccine following the Fort Dix, New Jersey, outbreak, have residual immunity to H1N1 2009, especially if they had been "primed" by earlier experience with H1 viruses from 1918 through 1957 [29] . Protective levels of residual antibody (titer > 1/80) have been found in 54% of such individuals, versus 33% of individuals over 60 years of age who did not receive the vaccine. Unfortunately, the higher fi gure does not apply to India or other countries where the 1977-78 "swine fl u" vaccine was not distributed to humans.
The sum total of these differences provide a ready molecular explanation for the fact that the current pandemic is concentrated in children and younger adults who have no experience with closely related H1 infl uenza viruses, and has largely spared the human population 60 and above, especially in the United States, who have immunologic memory of such viruses, albeit decades old.
H1N1 2009 is crippled, but could worsen clinically over time
It is a profound mystery to infl uenza virologists how H1N1 2009 is doing well enough in the human population to initiate a pandemic. Since 1918, novel infl uenza viruses have emerged by reassorting one or two gene segments, including the H gene segment, into the preexisting set of 6 or 7 gene segments that had long adapted to virus growth in human beings [30] Carolina/1/1918  --I--------------------------------S------- ----------L---------F-----------S-------------N--- 
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Site B * Site B this mold, being derived largely from animal infl uenza gene segments with no evidence of any adaptation to replication in humans. In several ways defi nable at the molecular level, it is a crippled virus in terms of human replication. Within the PB2 polymerase molecule, all known prior human infl uenza, including the A/New Jersey/1976 virus, has had lysine (K) at position 627 [31] . Avian and swine infl uenza viruses generally have a glutamate (E) at that position, substituting an acidic for a basic amino acid. This affects the pH optimum and the temperature optimum of the PB2 protein, such that a virus with 627E only relatively poorly replicates at the lower temperature of 33ºC. This represents a single point mutation that, if changed to K, would be predicted to signifi cantly enhance viral replication in the upper respiratory tract of humans, potentiating the spread of H1N1 2009 from person to person, and perhaps also worsening the clinical syndrome as well.
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In H1N1 2009, unlike nearly all prior human infl uenza viruses, one of the 11 viral proteins is not expressed at all. PB1-F2, a protein of 90 amino acids that contains a proapoptotic peptide at positions 66 through 75 [9] , is completely missing, and with it, any effect this protein normally exerts in limiting immune clearance of the virus from the respiratory tract [10] . This cripples part of the virus' defense mechanisms against human immunity, and presumably weakens its pathogenesis. The nucleotide sequence in H1N1 2009 that would normally code for PB1-F2 represents a very unusual genetic construct, in that it contains three stop codons at positions 12, 58 and 88 in the amino acid sequence [32] . Detailed consideration of this unusual genetic element is beyond the scope of the discussion here, but suffi ce it to say that the stop at position 12 can be circumvented by alternate initiation at a methionine at position 39, resulting in a functional fragment [10] , such as that found in the A/New Jersey/8/1976 virus [see Genbank listing for CY039997]. The stop at position 88 may be too close to the carboxy terminus to exert any signifi cant effect. Thus, the most signifi cant element in preventing the expression of a functional fragment of PB1-F2 lies in the stop at position 58. Again, as with PB2, a single point mutation would restore the stop codon to one coding for tryptophane (W), and rejuvenate H1N1 2009 with a functional proapoptotic protein that could interfere with immune clearance of the virus from the respiratory tract.
Thirdly, the emergent sequence of the neuramindase of H1N1 2009 was uniformly sensitive to the licensed drugs that inhibit the enzyme, giving us a powerful tool to combat the virus [28] . However, resistance to Tamifl u can be mediated by a single point mutation in the NA gene that results in a change from histidine to tyrosine (H274Y) close to the active site of the enzyme [33] . This H274Y mutation has already been noted a number of times independently around the world within the last few months, mostly in association with use of Tamifl u to combat infection [34] .
Just three point mutations, strategically placed and all selectable, stand in the way of an "improved" and potentially more dangerous H1N1 2009. Added to this scenario, which we would emphasize has not yet occurred except for the H274Y mutation, is the observation that H1N1 2009 is showing signs of genetic instability that may refl ect rapid adaptation to its new human host. Multiple studies have shown that there is an abnormally high ratio of non-synonymous to synonymous mutations as H1N1 has evolved in humans over the last several months [23, 24, 28] . Simply stated, the virus is changing in amino acid sequence faster than normally predicted by the overall mutational frequency. This is occurring in spite of the fact that the virus is not yet under immunological selective pressure -the overwhelming proportion of those it is infecting have never seen a similar H or N antigen. Only when the virus begins to encounter a signifi cant proportion of humans immune to H1N1 2009 by virtue of natural infection or immunization should we expect accelerated evolution in the antigenic sites of H and N antigens seen in previous human infl uenza subtypes. H1N1 2009 therefore must be considered genetically unstable at present, and unpredictable in terms of the changes that will occur as it continues to adapt to a human environment.
The H1N1 2009 Vaccine is essential for control
There are three options in managing pandemic infl uenza. Option 1 is to use general public health measures, such as handwashing, face masks, quarantine, school or public event closures etc. to inhibit the spread of the virus through the population [http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1fl u/]. These can produce temporary and localized effects, but ultimately the virus will reach a high proportion of the global population. Option 2 is mass prophylaxis by distributing antivirals such as Tamifl u to the population. This would only accelerate the eventual transition of the virus to Tamifl u-resistance within 18 to 36 months,. Such general use of drug prophylaxis is no longer recommended by WHO and CDC [see http://www.cdc.gov/ H1N1fl u/recommendations.htm], although it is obviously still being pursued in many communities. Neither of these options prevents a novel strain of infl uenza from infecting a large fraction of the human population over time. Option 3 is to massively immunize a large fraction of humanity with an appropriately formulated infl uenza vaccine. This not only slows the progress of the virus through the human population, but provides permanent protection against serious infection. This option is being actively pursued by governments throughout the world, and billions of doses of vaccine will eventually be made available as fast as current production schedules allow. It is our best hope of blunting the impact of H1N1 2009 globally.
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that infl uenza virus is inherently dangerous, even deadly, and that the vaccine should be enthusiastically embraced. The formulations and methods being used to manufacture the vaccine have been safe for decades. Concerns derived from problems with the 1977 vaccine are not relevant 32 years later.
Infl uenza H1N1 2009 is here to stay
No infl uenza virus has achieved this degree of penetration into the world population and failed to remain a fi xture in seasonal and epidemic respiratory disease for less than 10 years. Most have shown great staying power, causing periodic epidemics for over 30 years -as is true for each of the "seasonal" virus subtypes H1, H3 and B that have been in the formulation of the infl uenza virus vaccine for decades.
The most likely scenario is that H1N1 2009 will continue to propagate in humans for an indefi nite period, undergoing periodic mutational drift, and continuing to be the etiology of periodic epidemics of infl uenza for a decade or more into the future.
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